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1 
1     INTRODUCTION  
In her 2009 book, Liberal Loyalty: Freedom, Obligation, and the State, Anna Stilz makes 
a unique case for accepting special obligations to one's state and compatriots. Using the liberal 
principle of equal freedom, she argues that special obligations to the state—which include but 
are not limited to the duty to obey the law, the duty to participate in the shaping of law and 
policy, the duty to defend the state, and the duty to participate in schemes of funding and 
redistribution through taxation—are legitimate obligations that unite citizens in doing the good 
work of realizing justice. Significantly, Stilz argues that even when these obligations are 
unchosen, they are still legitimately imposed on citizens when the state is sufficiently just and 
democratic.  
Stilz is aware that this stance puts her at odds with the powerful arguments from many 
liberals, particularly philosophical anarchists, who declare that the special obligations demanded 
or coerced by the state are at odds with the liberal values of justice as equality and freedom.  
Stilz is attempting to establish special obligations as a specifically liberal position in the face of 
these arguments, particularly against what she perceives to be a liberal bias against special 
claims by institutions of justice.  As she writes in her Preface, "I fear . . . that those who are 
already loyal citizens may not be so for the right reasons--that is, for liberal reasons, and not 
patriotic or nationalist ones. And I fear that liberals are increasingly drawn to question the value 
of loyal citizenship in favor of a more cosmopolitan vision.  On both fronts, then, there is 
something to be said."
1
  For Stilz, where citizens are not loyal for the ‘right reasons’, and where 
an alternative vision such as philosophical anarchy beckons, the threat of state-breaking looms.   
In her book, Stilz attempts to craft a rebuttal to the liberal argument against special 
political obligations, and particularly addresses what she perceives to be the assault on such 
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obligations by philosophical anarchist A. John Simmons.  To do this, she first addresses general 
liberal challenges to the justification of the state by significantly recasting the role of the state in 
realizing justice, arguing from the logical implications of the nature of justice as understood by 
Immanuel Kant. Only when we see the requirements of justice clearly, Stilz argues, do we come 
to see that special obligations can, in fact, be justified not merely on brute facts, but on pre-
institutional principles and applied practical reasoning.  
Once she has argued for state justification, Stilz turns her attention to state legitimacy, to 
which Simmons poses a particularly strong challenge.   Here, she draws on Jean Jacques 
Rousseau to recast an extensive and demanding version of citizens’ special obligations as not 
only integral to, but legitimizing the authority of the state.     
In this rebuttal to philosophical anarchists, Stilz makes an interesting but flawed, foray 
into crafting an argument for keeping justified states, and for the continued existence of 
legitimate states and the specific obligations they demand.  In section I of this thesis, I will 
present the argument Stilz builds in favor of special obligations to one's own state as a source of 
justification for the state.  Next, I will address the arguments Simmons and other liberals make 
against using the particularity assumption as grounds for state justification.  In section II, I will 
present Stilz’s case for state legitimacy, including her argument for coercive state authority, and 
for special political obligation as necessary to fulfilling the demand of justice. Then I will look at 
Simmons’ argument that no existing state is legitimate in its demands of special political 
obligation, regardless of how morally justifiable that those demands may be.  Finally, I will 
identify implications of Stilz’s theory that I believe weaken her argument for special obligations 
to the state. 
3 
1.1 Stilz on Justification from the Particularity Argument   
Stilz believes that to establish loyalty as a legitimate demand of the state, an argument 
must be made that establishes the particularity assumption on grounds other than merely the 
brute facts of proximity.  This is not an easy task: Stilz defines the particularity assumption as the 
assumption that "a special bond of obligation . . . ties the citizen or resident to her state, and to 
her compatriots, and not to others, and requires her to support these people and these institutions 
and not others."
2
  Indeed, Stilz's definition of the particularity assumption does not seem to rule 
out the incorporation of proximity as part of the grounds for a special bond of obligation.  
Already belonging to a state seems to be a matter of proximity to begin with.   Since Stilz is 
concerned that proximity alone is not enough to ground loyalty for some liberals, she is eager to 
craft an argument that she believes liberals will accept, but which nevertheless incorporates 
proximity as reasonable grounds for loyalty.   To this end, Stilz attempts to craft an argument 
that also rests on the liberal extra-institutional values of freedom and equality.  If she can achieve 
this, Stilz believes that this will give her grounds for the second part of her argument, showing 
the possibility of the legitimate state and the acceptability of its coercive authority and demand 
for loyalty against the philosophical anarchist claims.      
Stilz begins her argument for the possible justification of states by focusing on the primary 
concern of liberals: the source and nature of obligations.  In the liberal tradition, Stilz points out, 
it is assumed that obligations necessarily arise from one of two sources. The first source is the 
nature of human beings themselves. Natural moral duties are assumed to be clear and obvious, 
and require no other source than that they are grounded in basic needs shared by all humans as 
humans.  Examples frequently cited include the duties not to murder, not to physically harm, and 
not to lie.  As such, they serve as a jumping off point for an array of seemingly fully determinate 
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rights.   The second source of obligations is contracts consensually and explicitly arranged 
between two or more autonomous individuals.
3
  In this case, specific obligations arise from 
explicit agreements or promises which define the terms, scope, and limitations of the obligation. 
The particularity of these special obligations is justifiable for liberals because the obligations in 
question are based on consent.  These traditional liberal sources of obligations are taken to by 
Stilz to be a challenge to state demands of loyalty in two key ways: in the first case, she argues, 
if certain natural moral duties are clearly determinate—if they have knowable, accessible 
content—then they do not require the state to define and regulate them, and state demands are 
superfluous.  In the second case, when natural moral duties are indeterminate—where the exact 
content of certain natural moral duties is not immediately clear, is subject to debate, or is 
determinate, but remains in some way epistemically inaccessible—it may still be possible to 
negotiate the terms and contents of the duties among affected individuals in such a way as to 
meet their needs.  In this case, a state may seem unnecessary even though it offers to provide its 
own content to the duty, with the added benefit of enforcement.  
In reply, Stilz argues that liberals wrongly place special political obligations into one of 
these two categories of obligation, as a result of “the false view that all our obligations must 
spring from one of [the] two possible sources.”4  Political obligations, Stilz wants to argue, are of 
a different type; they neither rise from basic rights held by all humans as human, nor are they 
typically consensually and explicitly contracted.
5
  Stilz presents an alternative to the “two types” 
cited by liberals: “I believe that particular political obligations can be defended if we step outside 
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5
 Stilz, Liberal Loyalty, 20. 
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this two-part moral structure, and that there is good reason to think that the nature of equal 
freedom as a political value may actually require us to step outside of it.”6   
Stilz thus begins to lay out her argument for this third way.  Let us suppose that there are 
some obligations that by their nature cannot be immediately and clearly elucidated:  “There may, 
in other words, be a third variety of liberal value with reference to which our obligations to 
particular states and compatriots might be justified, and this third variety would consist in those 
duties that are mediated, and thus ‘filled out’ or fully defined, only by the establishment of public 
authorities.”7  Although they may be general obligations due to every person arising from their 
status as humans, the manner by which they are defined or specified is variable or contextual. If, 
for example, a neighbor is hungry, fellow individuals--those within proximity--may nonetheless 
find various solutions to meeting this need.  A gift of food, or of money, or of education, or 
employment may all be offered, and meet the immediate need.  Those who still perceive a duty 
but are not within proximity might attempt less direct ways of aid, such as the offer of money, 
advice, or an attempt to influence those closer to provide aid.  As we can see, both perspective 
and proximity can alter the precise determination of what form best fulfills the indeterminate 
moral duty to provide aid.  Because the content of this type of obligation can be variable, some 
methods of defining that content might be more suitable or desirable than other methods, 
depending on the context.  Communication among individuals fleshes out and makes determinate 
the content.  When this communication is broad enough to generate community consensus, this 
consensus may shape an obligation that is special and particular in regard to the members of that 
community, while simultaneously fulfilling the universal but general and indeterminate 
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obligation it is based upon.
8
  When that community consensus surrounding the determination of 
an otherwise general obligation is strong enough, it marshals local authority and institutions in its 
framing, reinforcement, and punishment. In this way, institutions are created or become involved 
in regulating a particular form of a universal obligation so that members of the institution 
become morally bound to each other in a particular way.  Here, Stilz argues, Immanuel Kant and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau are incredibly helpful to the argument, providing grounds for the notion 
that the justification of states can be grounded in securing the equal freedom of its members.
9
 As 
Stilz points out, the groundwork for this kind of mediation can be found in both philosophers, 
who  
thought that the value of equal freedom could only be realized through the state. 
The reason they thought equal freedom required this kind of mediation was that 
prior to the establishment of the state, the value of equal freedom is indeterminate 
with respect to certain key questions.  That moral ideal, on their view, does not 
yet carry with it a complete set of clear and definite “natural duties,” which are 
publicly knowable to all individuals upon reflection, and which can answer 
certain fundamental questions, especially questions about the legitimate extent of 
our property and the limits of our “acquired” rights. 10 
 
Once we arrive at the specific shape of duties from the indeterminate obligations, the issue of 
what social agreements are necessary in order to underwrite equal freedom becomes formalized 
when we create laws that can secure conditions for equal freedom’s realization.  “If freedom is . . 
. a value that takes an institutionally mediated form,” argues Stilz, “then it follows that the 
existence of the state is not morally irrelevant to establishing a condition of equal freedom.”11   
It is in this transition from indeterminate obligations to the formalization of social 
agreements that we find justification for the state.  As Stilz writes, “the existence of the state as 
an institution can be justified by the fact that it helps us realize some preinstitutional value that 
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could not possibly be realized without it.”12  More concisely, “only a state can create the 
conditions in which equal freedom between individuals is realized.”13  However, for Stilz, the 
idea that only a state can create conditions for equal freedom does not underwrite state-breaking.  
Instead, Stilz takes the state as a necessary condition for equal freedom to mean that we have an 
obligation to support and uphold current institutions, provided that they are sufficiently just. 
 
1.2 The Liberal Challenge to the Particularity Assumption  
Stilz’s stated purpose is to establish normative grounds for political obligation which can be 
accepted by the liberal, and she believes that the first step necessary to establish this is to argue 
for the particularity assumption as grounds for justification of the reasonably just state.  Among 
liberals, the philosophical anarchist makes perhaps the strongest argument against this 
justification phase of Stilz’s argument for political obligation.  The liberal argument finds its 
ground in challenging the assumptions built into our intuitions about our relationship to other 
humans and to the state.  To assess Stilz’s justification argument, I will first examine the 
intuition, as addressed by Stilz and by liberals in general, and then turn to the challenge that Stilz 
believes A. John Simmons presents to political obligation, and finally, hear Simmons’ own 
argument for evaluating the possibility of a justified state. 
When we begin our reasoning about our place and responsibility in the world, our starting 
point is often our commonsense intuitions about what it means to be a citizen of an existing state.  
Stilz lays these intuitions out for us neatly. First, we assume that the world is constructed of 
states. Second, we tend to think that the existence of the state can have “moral salience,” that it 
can make a moral difference.  
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The line of reasoning from our intuitions about citizenship does not stop here. Stilz points 
out that our intuitions about the moral significance of the state, and of our relationship to it, have 
implications for our lives as citizens of the state.  We rely on our intuition about moral salience 
to ground our idea that we have an obligation to support and obey the law.  When we are the 
participants of a democracy, we believe we have some responsibility to the formulation of the 
law and to ensuring that it is carried out justly and effectively.  Our intuition about membership 
in a state also implies that we are charged with a duty to make a positive contribution to the 
funding, taxation, and redistribution schemes set up by our state.  Additionally, we feel that 
membership charges us with the duty to defend the state against unjust incursions by others, 
foreign or domestic.  Together, Stilz argues, these intuitions about our special duties and 
obligations form a body of political obligations that is unique to us within our state.
14
   
For some liberals, however, something about this intuition is unsettling.  The source of 
their criticism begins the notion of moral salience rising out of brute accident.  What are the 
moral implications of assuming that the accident of my birth can result in unchosen obligations 
to a particular state? Is the brute fact of the geographic location of my existence enough to 
underwrite moral obligations and benefits in an institution that happened to receive me but not 
others? Some liberals believe they can provide an argument against the particularity assumption 
by forcing us to reconsider our intuitions about who we owe duties to, and why.  To argue this, 
some in the cosmopolitan and philosophical anarchist camps begin by attacking the notion that 
just because the particularity assumption is embedded in our intuitions about citizenship and 
loyalty, somehow this is enough to justify it.    
 According to cosmopolitans and philosophical anarchists, the particularity principle 
results in benefits and rights bestowed arbitrarily according to membership and boundary lines—
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brute facts which we neither deserve, nor earn, yet which result in an increase in the measure of 
respect we are owed.  The moral salience of membership, or of duties of justice we owe to other 
members for no reason other than chance, stands in stark contrast to duties of justice we owe 
from principles that are universally applicable. As Thomas Pogge writes, justice is due to every 
person and bestows on every human being a “global stature as the ultimate unit of moral 
concern.”15 The demand of justice, then, lends equal status to each and every individual, contrary 
to the particularity assumption of partiality to one’s fellow citizens.   
 When the individual is considered the unit of ultimate moral concern, the duty of justice 
to her based on principles of equality and freedom cannot be ignored, regardless of her location. 
Nevertheless, even a just state is by its nature equally just and beneficial only to a few, defined as 
its citizens, while its refusal of services beyond its boundaries seems to result in an injustice to 
many.  To make matters worse, as state institutions are developed to more effectively protect the 
rights of citizens and fulfill obligations owed to their citizens, justice is transformed from 
something owed to all humans into a pattern of obligation between state and citizen. In effect, it 
seems to become not only permissible, but incumbent upon individuals to fail to act impartially 
toward all individuals, focusing instead upon what they now owe the state in exchange for the 
protections and benefits now afforded them as members enjoying an artificially elevated status 
that gives them access to a pooled concentration of resources.  “Citizenship in Western liberal 
democracies,” writes Joseph Carens, “is the modern equivalent of feudal privilege—an inherited 
status that greatly enhances one’s life chances.  Like feudal birthright privileges, restrictive 
citizenship is hard to justify when one thinks about it closely.”16  As Stilz points out, the problem 
confronted by a liberal who accepts the particularity assumption “stems from the fact that the 
                                                 
15
 Pogge, World Poverty, 169, and Stilz, Liberal Loyalty, 9. 
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principles of freedom and equality, on which a liberal theory of justice is based, are meant to be 
universally applicable.”17   
On initial reflection, aspects of what Stilz refers to as "the liberal view", or more 
precisely, here the Pogge-Carens view, are appealing: I have the same need for food, shelter, 
protection, and minimal access to the means of production as does an individual half the world 
away.
18
 “On [the presumably liberal] view,” Stilz writes, “state boundaries do not impose any 
restrictions on justice, which is always universal in scope.”19  Here the cosmopolitan-minded 
liberal of Stilz's argument appears to be satisfied to sacrifice a particular duty to compatriots so 
as not to commit injustice against a broader, universal audience. Reasoning from the brute fact of 
state membership looks like an unattractive argument when compared against the liberal claim 
that justice should not “be constrained by state of national boundaries.”20   
If, as Pogge argues, the human is the “ultimate unit of moral concern,” then it seems 
obvious that justice would demand that we eschew obligations and commitments that hinder 
individuals from meeting the just claims of other individuals.
21
  As Stilz points out, the conflict 
of universal demands of justice with the particularity assumption arises when we suppose that 
“we owe more as a matter of justice to persons who have certain particular, and non universal 
features.”22 Justice, argues the liberal, demands more than a limited and fraternally motivated 
assistance, and Stilz concedes that partiality based on citizenship does appear to unattractively 
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“sneak in a whole set of non-liberal considerations at the foundation of a liberal political 
theory.”23  
If the Pogge-Carens argument above is correct, then their challenge to the particularity 
assumption does seem to be a powerful argument from liberal principles.  It is at this point that 
Simmons’ contributions to the argument against the particularity assumption might seem to 
strengthen the case against the possibility of a justified state.  Instead, Simmons finds a way to 
redeem the possibility of the justified state, but with unexpected consequences for liberal 
loyalists like Stilz. 
 
1.3  Stilz on Simmons and the Particularity Assumption
24
 
Stilz has taken aim at the argument that the particularity assumption cannot, in itself, as an 
assumption, be an unquestioned ground for establishing loyalty.  If the use of the particularity 
assumption as grounds for justification is a source of discomfort to liberals in general, then this 
discomfort is amplified for philosophical anarchists like Simmons. Stilz believes that Simmons’ 
argument against state legitimacy targets the link between the general duty and the specific duty.  
She writes, “The criticism is that a justice-based account cannot establish a sufficiently tight 
connection between the citizen’s general obligation to establish and uphold just states and a 
special obligation to support her particular state or to show solidarity with her compatriots.”25  
The truth of Simmons’ position, however, is more nuanced, and centers on the difference 
between grounding legitimacy in justifiable uses of authority, and grounding legitimacy in 
consent to the agent wielding justifiable authority. 
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Stilz wishes to establish a line of reasoning that says that in order to be truly moral 
beings, we must accept a general obligation to establish and uphold justified states.  To the 
extent that this means that we are required to behave morally with others, and to not work 
against structures of justice, Simmons would agree.  Thus, Simmons agrees with Stilz to the 
extent that he believes that a state and its use of force can be morally justifiable.  Stilz wants to 
argue that the coercion of non-consenting individuals is necessary in cases where a failure of 
consent may contribute to the erosion of the state, causing either collapse or weakness. The key 
concern here seems to be the idea that any erosion of the state might lead to weakening a 
structure of justice, which would lead to a lack of security, and in turn result in an inability to 
protect equal freedom for all.  Simmons does not disagree here, and indeed, allows that force can 
be morally justifiable.   
Simmons disagrees with Stilz on two key points, however. Instead, he is concerned with 
how Stilz treats the notions of coercion, authority, and legitimacy.   Instead, Simmons argues, 
while this coercion of non-consenting citizens does not interfere with the justifiability of the use 
of force, it still leaves in question the role and relationship of the agent doing the enforcing.  In 
other words, the mere act of providing enforcement to widely agreed-upon contents of certain 
rights is not enough to underwrite legitimacy.  Second, Simmons points out that positions such as 
the one held by Stilz are grounded on the belief that the justifiability of a state automatically 
generates moral claims of support upon the individuals whose support might impact it, even if 
only indirectly. Simmons disagrees, arguing that the moral justifiability of a state is distinct from 
the moral demand that individuals give their consent to it.  In this way, Simmons argues, there is 
recognition that there is a fundamental error in assuming that a state’s  justifiability is sufficient 
to  generate legitimacy, where legitimacy means being owed special obligations by citizens.   
13 
What Simmons disagrees with Stilz about is her claim that there is a positive moral obligation to 
“establish” just states and that there is a positive moral obligation to “uphold” that state.  As 
Simmons points out,  
The problem for Natural Duty accounts. . . to which I point here is (part of) what I 
have elsewhere called the “particularity problem”: A general moral duty to 
promote justice—or any other impartial value—cannot bind one specially to 
support or comply with one particular state or society (such as “my own”) . . . 
Natural moral duties will bind me as strongly with respect to persons or 
institutions that are not close to me as they will with respect to those that are. . . 
26
 
 
Elsewhere, Simmons writes,  
First, because these duties [not to murder, not to steal or lie, to give aid to those in 
need, or to promote justice] are binding on all persons, the content of any such 
duty will be general.  Our duties will bind us, say, to give aid to anyone who is in 
need or to refrain from stealing simpliciter (under normal conditions); they will 
not bind us only with respect to particular persons, institutions, or sets of 
institutions.  By making a promise or entering into some other special relationship 
I can establish a moral tie between myself and some particular party.  But the 
natural duties, not being grounded in special transactions, lack this kind of 
“particularity.”27 
 
As Simmons points out, what is needed to establish the particularity assumption is a feature or a 
line of reasoning that does the work of attaching that state to that moral individual, something 
that proximity on its own cannot achieve.   
If the proximity alone cannot establish the link Stilz desires, what does the work of 
grounding the political obligation of an individual to “her state”?  For Simmons, it is clear that 
only explicit consent can ground special political obligation, regardless of the justifiability of the 
state.  Although Stilz has argued that a blend of proximity, attachment to territory governed by a 
state, and moral obligation does this work, Simmons disagrees on all counts.    Proximity cannot 
do the work of tethering an individual to a state without consent, Simmons argues, because the 
duty that compels me to behave morally and support—or at least not undermine--one just state is 
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a general moral obligation.  As such, Simmons points out, “While it follows that I have an 
obligation to support my government, it does not follow that there is anything special about this 
obligation.  I am equally constrained by the same moral bound to support every other just 
government. Furthermore, the obligation in question alone would not bind me to any particular 
political authority in the way that we want.”28 As Simmons argues,  
Living in the domain of government A certainly makes it easier for me to support 
government A than to support any other just government; but it is not obvious that 
this should affect the scope of the moral requirement to support just governments.  
If we allowed such a move, it would follow that when I got to live for a month 
with my friends in the domain of just government B, all of my political 
obligations would transfer automatically to government B, regardless of whether I 
have any other significant relations with that government.  But this seems wildly 
implausible, unless we believe that my residence in this domain in itself 
establishes for me an obligation to support government B . . . the point to note is 
that even if my residence in the domain of just government B were morally 
significant in this way, the moral bond generated would be a new “particularized” 
bond, quite unrelated to any duty or obligation I might have to support just 
governments.
29
 
 
Thus, claims that proximity and a general moral duty to justice underwrite our intuition of a 
special obligation to “our” state are not only groundless, according to Simmons, but actually 
undermine the notion of a particularly exclusive political obligation, which Stilz is so keen to 
establish.     
1.4  Simmons on the Possibility of Justification 
 Nevertheless, while Simmons does not believe that particularity, proximity, or general 
moral duty can ground a special political obligation, he does not rule out the possibility of a 
justified state.  In addressing this crucial difference, Simmons begins by outlining the problem 
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inherent in basing state justification on the particularity assumption.  As Simmons concedes, the 
task of identifying what it is we do when we undertake to justify the state can be tricky:  
’Justifying the state,’ with its all-inclusive tone, might at first be thought to have 
to involve showing that every possible state is immune to any systematic 
noncomparative moral objections.
30
  Or it might be taken to involve showing that 
any possible state is preferable to (or as good as) any possible condition of 
statelessness.  If we understand “justifying the state” in either of these senses, 
then, justifying the state is, I think, impossible.
31
  
Simmons then outlines his criteria for evaluating the justifiability of a state:   
If “justifying the state” is to identify any plausible enterprise in political 
philosophy, then it should at least be taken also to be accomplished if we can 
show that one or more specific kinds of state are morally defensible 
(comparatively or noncomparatively). So, I suggest, we can justify the state by 
showing that some realizable type of state is on balance morally permissible (or 
ideal) and that it is rationally preferable to all feasible nonstate alternatives.  In 
the course of such a justification we will typically argue that certain virtues that 
states may possess or goods they may supply—such as justice or the rule of law—
make it a good thing to have such states in the world.
32
 
 
Simmons does allow that such justification will not make everyone happy.  Stilz’s ambition is, 
after all, to provide liberal grounds for special obligation to the legitimate state, and her version 
of special obligation is not satisfied with merely the permissible or the preferable, but the 
mandatory, even if it only applies to qualified cases.  This, after all, is the reason for her 
argument—to prevent diverse loyalties among citizens in a single legitimate state, or in extreme 
cases, state-breaking.  But Simmons points to another weakness of this type of argument for 
justification:   
Such a justification, of course, will provide some comfort to those who have 
chosen to live in a justified state. . . But most of us don’t choose the states in 
which we live, and almost none of us chose to live in a state (as opposed to 
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something else).  It seems plain that standard justifications of the state are offered 
not to happy participants in states but to those moved by certain kinds of 
objections to states.
33
 
It is not enough to provide a line of reasoning to justify a state for those already inclined 
to accept and uphold memberships.  One must also prove that the state is legitimate—that 
it has compelling reasons to demand special duties, such as those duties to participate in 
state systems and schemes, from those who are nonetheless disinclined to acknowledge 
special membership claims.  In each case, prior to making the case for its own 
legitimation, the state must prove that the existence of the state is not “practically inferior 
to life without the state.”34  
 Simmons, however, allows that while state justification on the grounds of 
proximity is not feasible, it is possible to justify a state on the grounds of being morally 
permissible and rationally preferable.
35
  In fact, Simmons goes so far as to admit that “if 
it is logically and physically possible that a state arise and operate without violating 
anyone’s rights, and if such a state would be rationally preferable to nonstate alternatives, 
then the anarchist objection is rebutted and (in that sense) the state (i.e., that particular 
kind of state) is justified.”36   
In taking this position, Simmons departs from the common anarchist position, but 
it is noteworthy what the grounds for a morally justified state really establish.  The 
justified state can certainly coerce, but moral justification for coercion of even those who 
do not lend their consent cannot provide grounds for the state’s legitimacy.  Understood 
this way, the justified state is attractive, but it cannot demand special obligations from its 
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citizens unless it is legitimate.  Furthermore, it cannot be said that Stilz has done much 
more than establish the usefulness or desirability of the state for those individuals who 
want it.   At this point, nothing about the possibility of the existence of a justified state 
underwrites the high level of special obligation which Stilz would like to enforce.     
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2     LEGITIMACY 
2.1 Stilz on Legitimacy and Justifiability 
Up until now, Stilz has been concerned with combating what she perceives to be 
the liberal challenge to special political obligations.  The first step in her task was to 
establish a theory of what justifies the establishment of state authority.  For Stilz, 
justification of the state relies on Kant’s argument that without the state, rights and duties 
are insufficiently defined in order to provide freedom equally.  By highlighting the 
process through which the state and  its laws make indeterminate moral duties 
determinate and effective, Stilz believes she can build a bridge from the existence of 
vague natural moral duty to defined political obligation and loyalty.  Nevertheless, Stilz 
does not want to commit us to just any state we happen to find ourselves in, no matter 
how justifiable an enforcing agent that state might be.  To this end, Stilz acknowledges 
that a state that is morally justifiable at its inception must continue to serve the purpose of 
providing equal freedom in order to continue to command its members. For Stilz, it 
would seem that a state is morally justifiable so long as the content and enforcement of 
rights is necessary to equal freedom.  Being a legitimate state, for Stilz, appears to mean 
that the state is an agent of force that historically and currently wields enforcing power 
equally at a sufficiently high rate of success in order to ensure equal freedom for all.  
Legitimacy, then, is about maintaining a history of justifiable authority at acceptable 
thresholds.      
If liberal justification of a state is based on “moral salience” and the desire to 
provide equal freedom as a matter of justice, then how is a state’s legitimacy evaluated 
19 
and what does it measure?  Stilz acknowledges that this is a complicated task.  She 
writes, “Whether the laws conform to our substantive views about justice is not a 
sufficient criterion for judgment . . . whatever criteria for state legitimacy we put forward 
must be consistent with the possibility of ongoing and reasonable disagreement of what 
justice ideally means.”37   
This becomes the crucial point that Stilz must account for in her theory.  Her Kantian 
account of state justification relied upon a group of individuals coming to agreement over 
determinate rules derived from general moral principles and duties.  In this theory, justice only 
arises upon the adoption of laws and rules that can be agreed upon and enforced, and the state 
exists to provide the mechanisms for the continuous process of determining and enforcing 
justice.  Here, however, we again confront the problem that brought individuals into cooperation 
to form the state in the first place: disagreement over the shape of appropriate moral behavior.  
Group consensus does the heavy lifting in Stilz’s evaluation theories, providing the impetus for 
forming the moral state, generating the authorizing source of power in the state, and ultimately 
serving as the criteria for evaluating its continued moral salience.  Whether or not it can do the 
work Stilz lays out for it in legitimating the state may rest on how Stilz defines legitimacy and 
reconciles group consensus and disagreement among members in the pursuit of justice. 
 
2.2      Turning to Rousseau 
In Stilz’s political theory, the state emerges out of a desire among individuals to 
render the greatest degree of freedom equally  This single common desire—for equal 
freedom, or security—provides cohesiveness to the group, although it is still composed of 
individuals.  Based on this common desire, Stilz believes that when the state emerges and 
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undertakes the process of governing towards the ends of providing justice, it—and we—
rely on the state as a unified source of agency to establish, enact, and enforce laws that 
have moral salience.  But as Stilz illuminates through Kant’s theory, the group which 
generates the state is composed of individuals.  How, exactly, does the aggregate 
agencies of all of those individuals transform into the authority of the state, and how does 
it maintain unity in the face of continued disagreements of those individuals? 
In order to ground the state's legitimacy in liberal values, Stilz moves away from 
Kant in favor of Rousseau.  This decision is crucial to her theory.  As Stilz tells it, 
contemporaries to Rousseau developed theories of political and state legitimacy based on 
a hypothetical state of nature origins which tended towards voluntary enslavement 
accounts or unwieldy artificial convention theories.  In theories such as those put forward 
by Hobbes and Grotius, an entire people could voluntarily “alienate its will in perpetuity 
to a monarch, in the hope of thereby ensuring its preservation of security”—a situation 
that resembled perpetual indentured servitude, not the preservation of equal freedom.
38
  
Theories of this type were grounded in the notion of “artificial conventions made by free 
human beings,” in which a single individual explicitly and voluntarily alienated her own 
freedom in exchange for the protection of the state.
39
   On Stilz’s reading, however, 
Kant’s theory of the justified state essentially licensed any state authority as legitimate so 
long as order was maintained.
40
  None of these options provides Stilz with the liberal 
foundation she believes she needs for establishing legitimate grounds for coercion and 
special political obligation, while allowing for equal freedom.      
            While Kant is unable to provide Stilz support for legitimacy arguments, the first 
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two theories are particularly noteworthy in how they come to inform and shape 
Rousseau’s theory of the legitimate state.  In the first two types, political authority is 
artificially created from the explicit exchange of freedom for protection, the first by a 
group, the second by individuals.  One of the difficulties with either type of theory, as 
Stilz points out, is that if individual freedom is real, then “to give up one’s status as a 
being with any legal claims and to turn oneself into someone else’s property (as the slave 
does) is necessarily also to give up the ability to make contracts and to be obligated by 
them.”41  Freedom cannot be the currency which buys the state authority to protect said 
freedom.  Instead, for Rousseau, theories founded on such renunciation are problematic 
since “to renounce one’s freedom is to renounce one’s quality as man, the rights of 
humanity, and even its duties.”42 Renunciation removes the individual and group from the 
mutuality involved in legal obligations of rights and duties.  Stilz agrees, noting that 
“having a contractual obligation to another requires that one remain a legally separate 
person, with the standing to bring a claim against others; and this means one must 
preserve at least the essential rights of free personhood.  The rights of free personhood 
are inalienable.”43   
What about this informs Rousseau’s theory of legitimacy?  If alienating our own freedom 
invalidates any contracts we make to another party, then a form of governing must be found that 
preserves freedom and prevents domination by one agency.  In the end, for Rousseau, “if we 
accept . . . that legitimate political authority must be based on a convention between naturally 
free persons, we must also accept that this authority cannot possibly take the form of one 
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person’s domination over others.”44  As Stilz points out, the implications of this must be central 
to any legitimacy theory:  “If it is true that free conventions to give up our freedom are void, then 
we must always remain just as free inside a well-ordered state as we would be in the state of 
nature outside it.”45  But how are we to remain as free inside a state as we are outside of it? 
2.3      The General Will 
 In the task to establish criteria for legitimacy, Stilz looks to Rousseau, who in turn 
focuses on the key agency that has so far proven pivotal to his theory: the people.  If we can 
speak of a set of individuals who have agreed to form a collective body, then, Rousseau points 
out, “the body must have constituted a ‘people’—with a common will—prior to that act.”46 So 
what transforms an aggregate of individuals into a unified, collective “people”?47  
Rousseau suggests that an original convention exists between the originating members of 
that group, a convention that avoids alienating freedom, and yet accepts the imposition of a 
normative authority that is not wielded by any one person in such a way that might sever our 
freedom.  In this way, Rousseau believes that it is possible to establish authority in the group so 
that I am subject to no one else’s will, and remain free.  This, in turn, requires acknowledgement 
that there is something real and lasting in the agreement or consensus of a group, something that 
transforms it from an aggregate of individuals into an association.  
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Rousseau call this transformative consensus the general will, and he conceives it to be the 
“form of association that will defend and protect the persons and goods of each associate with 
the full common force, and by means of which, each uniting with all, nevertheless obey only 
himself and remain as free as before.”48  Rousseau’s general will acts to guard against 
enslavement and preserve equal freedom.   Collectively, a group of individuals preserving their 
own freedom but working for consensus with an eye toward equal freedom seems to constitute 
the perfect authority.   
This self-policing of the group, however, does come at a cost.  Preserving our own 
freedom while at the same time looking out for others’ freedom can create a tension among the 
different -interests of different individuals—much like the tension that existed in the state of 
nature.  Additionally, preserving our own freedom cannot be confused with indulging in self-
centeredness, however.  In order that we not alienate our freedoms and rights to one tyrant, and 
resolve the tensions of preserving our own freedom and that of others, we must acquiesce to “the 
total alienation of each associate with all of his rights to the whole community.”49 On its own, 
this acquiescence appears extreme, but from another perspective, it is merely a more generous 
formulation of Kant’s entrance into society.  As Stilz writes,  
As parties to the social contract, we no longer have valid rights against society 
itself, because the main clause of the social contract is that we agree to treat the 
will of society as a whole, when formulated in the right way, as definitive of our 
rights.  Were the individual to hold back some rights as nontransferable, 
according to this way of thinking, no true political authority could exist.
50
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Thus, as a member of the group my concern must be the equal freedom of all—not just my own 
freedom, or my own desires. 
It is important to note that this is a decision that cannot be made by an isolated individual.  
A personal choice for maximum individual freedom includes all of my interests because there is 
no other concern to weigh in the balance.  It is only when the individuals of a collective take an 
unselfish interest in the freedom of all that the general will emerges.  Mere agreement with 
society as a whole, however, is not enough to create the general will.  First, individuals must 
identify as participating members of the group.  This agreement carries with it, tacitly or 
explicitly, terms of participation and consensus
51
.  Secondly, individuals cannot be guided 
merely by easy acquiescence.  Here, Rousseau draws on his moral theory.  Acquiescence with 
any and every decision by the group is not enough to create the unity of the general will, as there 
is no guarantee that these decisions will be directed toward the common good.   When guided by 
amour propre, individuals are prone to compete in society for self-interested purposes, not 
necessarily for the good, or even for the benefit of others or of all.  This produces a collection of 
striving, competing, fractious individuals, but not a unified society interested in equal freedom.  
However, when oriented towards our knowledge of our moral duty, when made aware of 
suffering, need, and gratitude, self-interested striving is overcome.  It is at this point that the 
general will emerges.  When individuals unselfishly arrive at consensus and make decisions that 
respect rights and duties, thereby taking “actions that could be willed or consented to by 
everyone who is subject to them,” the authority of the state is applied to all equally, for all 
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equally.
52
  This constrained decision-making, which Rousseau calls the general will, considers 
the needs of all in shaping what can be agreed upon by all to be rights and duties.  This process 
both creates determinate rights and legitimates the mechanisms that enforce those rights.  As a 
result, members achieve equal freedom, subject to no one person, but checked and voiced by all, 
and in participating in the process, maintain their inalienable autonomy.
53
 It is at once 
paradoxical— alienating our freedom to the group in order to preserve a sphere of personal 
freedom—and the epitome of moral freedom.   
 The paradox of the general will that allows it to be both a mechanism for justifying and 
legitimating political authority is created not merely by each individual defining freedom, but by 
something more important—agreement of the group.  Rousseau writes that  
While the opposition of particular interests made the establishment of societies 
necessary, it is the agreement of these same interests which made it possible.  
What these different interests have in common is what forms the social bond, and 
if there were not some point on which all interests agree, no society could exist.
54
 
 
As Stilz points out, for Rousseau, “in any legitimate society—that is, any society held together 
by the voluntary recognition of its members, rather than by force—there must always be a 
unanimous agreement on at least one common interest.”55  This stands in contrast to the other 
motivations and justifications for entering the state—a cooperation born of our weakness and 
competing individual inclinations.  The tension in this paradox, however, requires constant 
tending, lest cooperation be carried too far and devolve into personal dependence.  Rousseau 
warns, “Everyone must see that since ties of servitude are formed solely by men’s mutual 
dependence and the reciprocal needs that unite them, it is impossible to subjugate a man without 
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first having placed him in the position of being unable to do without another.”56 Cooperation 
carried too far dips into servitude, but cooperation maintained through free agreement can 
coalesce into equality and unity. By engaging the mechanism of the state as guided by the 
general will to be guarantor of certain freedoms, we are able to engage in societal and political 
cooperation on a much surer footing, and less inclined to barter away inalienable freedoms or be 
manipulated, exploited, or coerced into compliance.
57
  As Stilz argues, Rousseau makes the state 
guided by general will the holder and guarantor of our rights and duties, allowing us to “take 
account of these others in a nonarbitrary way, in a way that limits the potential for capricious 
interference in others’ affairs.  Under law, he must respect the bounds of others’ sphere of liberty 
in exchange for their regard to his own.”58  Thus, Rousseau posits a negative interest, purely 
formal, of being free from undue influence of others, apart from what we concede in order to 
benefit from the protection and cooperation of the group.  As long as there is agreement on this 
one matter, the general will exists.
59
  What justifies the state guided by the general will is our 
weakness; what legitimates it is the activity of practicing equal freedom in accordance with the 
general will. 
2.4 The Limits of the General Will 
While the general will is gives unity to a group, Stilz and Rousseau are eager to point out that not 
every unified expression of agreement is a manifestation of the general will.  The general will is 
the concerted agreement to engender reciprocal independence and equal freedom.  It may 
manifest itself in laws and policy, but the existence of laws and policies—even when generated 
from wide agreement—are not sufficient to qualify as the general will, and thus do not guarantee 
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legitimacy.  Neither are democratic mechanisms alone enough to ensure a legitimate state.   
Rousseau writes that “The general will is always upright, but the judgment that guides it is not 
always enlightened.”60  While democratic voting may be a necessary component of group unity, 
the will of a person voting may be fractured.  Instead of voting from an enlightened position, she 
may instead be voting from her private will, or from her corporate will—representing interests of 
other groups she may belong to or wish to join.  Thus, a vote may represent competing 
motivations rather than a desire for justice.  When all the votes within the state are put together, a 
democratic vote may reflect the will of all, yet still fail to manifest the general will.  As Rousseau 
writes,  
There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general 
will; the latter considers only the common interest, while the former takes private 
interest into account, and is no more than a sum of particular wills: but take away 
from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel one another, and the 
general will remains as the sum of the differences.
61
  
 
Although the people’s single unifying interest in equal freedom may do the work of justifying 
the existence of the state, a democratic mechanism is not enough to guarantee the presence of the 
general will, or of the legitimacy of the state.   
 
2.5 How a People Becomes a Legitimate State 
If the democratic mechanism itself is not enough to guarantee legitimacy, but is still 
necessary, then what is lacking?  It would seem that what Stilz is lacking here is Rousseau’s 
ability to speak of a set of individuals who have agreed to form a collective body.  As Rousseau 
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points out, prior to lawmaking and the formulation of determinate special obligations, “the body 
must have constituted a ‘people’—with a common will—prior to that act.”62  
As we have seen, Rousseau believes that the general will ensures a legitimate state, but 
Rousseau does not claim that consensus alone qualifies as the general will.  In addition to 
individuals agreeing to form a collective body, Rousseau lays the groundwork for good 
intentions. In order to qualify as the general will, consensus requires sincerity, a commitment to 
equal freedom, and the cultivated habit of considering the needs of others weighted fairly against 
one’s own.63  Put simply, it requires the intent to a) be a participating member, and b) fulfill our 
moral duty to one another.   
This habit of considering other’s needs in the pursuit of equal freedom need not be 
perfectly realized.  For Rousseau, the intention of ensuring equal freedom is enough to raise an 
aggregate into a unified group.  The citizen may hold mistaken beliefs, be unsuitably challenged 
about her prejudices or perspective, or be unaware of otherwise overriding motives, but so long 
as the intention is pure, these shortcomings can all be corrected through concerted effort at 
education toward solidarity.
64
   
In this theoretical scenario, intent is the operative feature.  As such, laws guided by the 
general will need not be perfect, or even unanimous, to meet the criteria of legitimacy.  So long 
as they are guided by intent and secured by democratic mechanisms, the laws can be corrected to 
address shortcomings as they are realized.  The crucial factor in assessing legitimacy is whether 
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the law, and the state which enforces it, is “suitably general” in its application to all.  As Jeremy 
Waldron points out, “if there is disagreement, and if, in spite of that disagreement, you can be 
sure that citizens are nonetheless addressing the general good, then ‘the votes of the greatest 
number always bind the rest.’”65  As Stilz writes, “Provided that a law has truly taken my 
interests into account, the fact that it disagrees with my opinion does not render it a threat to my 
freedom: it does not grant other people an unequal share of coercive power over me, because it 
protects my interests on an equal basis with theirs.”66  So long as rights are made determinate in 
the form of laws that are mutually considered and generally voted upon, dissent does not nullify 
the general will, (so long as one agrees with Rousseau’s moral theory).67  And so long as the 
general will underwrites laws that make equal freedom determinate without fostering 
dependency or servitude, the law that it writes, and the state that enforces and administers it, is 
legitimate.  Legitimacy, for Stilz, is found under a body of law which uses the general will to 
ensure equal freedom for all members.  Thus, for Stilz, the general will, when fully accounting 
for group membership and democratic participation may be the best measure of whether a state’s 
laws manifest justice by explicating the widest accepted interpretation of the content of a right. 
2.6 How Legitimacy Demands Participation 
So far, Stilz has worked hard to establish   citizens’ special obligations to their own state on a 
basis that is more secure than brute proximity or luck.  She has laid out an argument in which the 
people themselves hypothetically form a consensus to rise out of a state of nature and into a state 
of justice.  She has defined how it is that the general will emerges, transforming the aggregate 
into a cohesive group.  And, lastly, she has shown how with proper intent and the mechanism of 
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democracy, a state may earn legitimacy through the striving of the general will, even when a 
minority disagrees with the specific shape of the outcome.  The unity holds, even in 
disagreement, when disagreement is about how the general moral duties are made determinate, 
and not about the general moral duties themselves.   
This position of relying on the general will to legitimate the state creates another demand, 
however.  In any state, achieving the very high degree of voluntary participation necessary in 
order to fully explicate the general will is highly unlikely, and this in itself leads to two 
problems.  First, individuals who fail to participate may attempt to argue that the state no longer 
represents them, and they may attempt to leave, thereby weakening solidarity, state resources, 
and state authority.  Second, individuals who fail to participate may in their absence skew the 
discussion, resulting in policies and laws of limited benefit and application.  This, in turn, 
weakens the state’s claim to legitimacy, and by Stilz’s line of reasoning, causes the state to falter 
in its service of justice to all its members.  In either case, whether directly, by dissent, or 
indirectly, by abstention, the individual who fails to participate threatens the stability and 
legitimacy of the state.  As Stilz puts it in a parable about subway riders banding together to save 
a fellow rider from a strangler--there is in fact a moral duty to form a group to meet a threat of 
injustice:   
. . . they are obliged to act together, since that is the only way to save the victim, 
and therefore they are obliged to create the conditions that make joining action 
possible, by communicating their intentions, and the like. . . It doesn’t matter that 
they didn’t consent to being faced with this situation . . . that they may not 
identify with the other riders, or would prefer not to act together with them.  They 
have a duty to constitute themselves into a group, since that is the right way to 
save the person. . . If they refuse to do so, we can hold them morally 
responsible.
68
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In short, Stilz writes, “we have an unconditional duty, binding on us independently of our goals 
and choices, to participate in a just state.”69  Thus, the Kantian duty to form the state, or 
rightfully be coerced into forming it, also holds for participation, since participation not only 
enacts the practice of justice, but continues to legitimize the state which makes justice possible.
70
   
2.7 Stilz Summary 
Stilz wants to establish grounds for special political obligations, or political duties owed 
to the state regardless of our consent.  The first step to establishing this has been to evaluate 
whether the existence of a state could ever be justified, and for this, Stilz turned to Kant.  As we 
see, establishing state legitimacy, however, is another thing entirely.  While the purpose of a 
state might be to bring justice as equal freedom, legitimacy is, in this case, an evaluation in 
which the state itself is tested according to the normative criterion of the general will, and then 
assessed for whether it still deserves to claim special obligations of its members. For Stilz that 
criterion is how closely the state adheres to the general will in meeting the needs of justice as 
equal freedom.  When the level of involvement is sufficiently high, and sufficiently moral, the 
democratic state cannot help but be legitimate.  It is legitimate in its formation, and it continues 
to be legitimate, so long as member participation remains high and oriented toward the public 
good.  A justified state can, under Stilz’s theory, cease to be legitimate under a specific set of 
circumstances: partial citizen participation in seeking the public good, and full participation that 
fails to seek the public good, and cases in which legitimate states are overthrown by an outside 
and unjust usurper.
71
   Given these criteria, actual states can be proven illegitimate for groups, 
even whole territories, of people to whom it fails to provide equal freedom.  As such, even 
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existing states that are legitimate for some, may not be legitimate for all.  From this reasoning, 
Stilz arrives at the conclusion that not only is it morally required for citizens who benefit from 
state-sponsored equal freedom to be incorporated into the state in order support structures of 
justice as equal freedom, but that in order to continue the work of doing justice, the citizen is 
obligated in continuous support of the state so long as it is sufficiently just. 
2.8 Simmons on State Legitimacy 
While Stilz could be unfairly accused of dissolving legitimacy into justification through 
her emphasis on an individual moral duty to establish and uphold the state as a means of justice, 
for Simmons, separating out these two evaluations is vital to understanding the underlying 
problem with natural duty theories like Stilz’s.  Simmons writes: 
Showing that it is possible for (a certain kind of) state to arise and function 
without immorality and that having such a state would be a good thing—that the 
state is justified . . . is obviously not the same thing as showing that a particular 
actual state (even of that kind) did in fact arise and does in fact function in 
morally acceptable ways.  . . I think this observation points the way to a quite 
basic distinction between justification and legitimacy.  . . Showing that a 
particular state is legitimate appears to be . . . a function of showing that the 
actual history of the state’s relationship to its individual subjects is morally 
acceptable.
72
 
 
For Simmons, then, it is not that any state is necessarily illegitimate.
73
  Instead, for Simmons, the 
simple fact is that while there are conditions under which a state is morally justifiable, current 
existing states are illegitimate on a posteriori grounds, primarily based on, but not limited to, 
their morally coercive practices.
74
 The crucial point for Simmons is that even if state authority is 
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morally justifiable, and the use of force for moral ends is justifiable, in cases where at least some 
of the people have not “performed certain voluntary acts which make those institutions apply to 
them in the strong sense”, the state itself does not generate the obligations necessary to bind 
them to the state.
75
  In other words, it is the agreement of individual persons, for Simmons, and 
not the claim of the state on the people, that generates the obligation to support the state. To see 
how Simmons arrives at this conclusion, it helps to understand the assumptions he relies on to 
build his case. 
2.9 Simmons on Legitimacy Theories  
Simmons begins his case much in the same way Stilz does—in the state of nature.  To 
begin with, Simmons argues, let us accept that even without political institutions, we would still 
be bound by certain natural duties due to all human beings qua human—by virtue of their being 
human.
76
  These “natural” moral duties are general, meaning that they are prior to and binding 
regardless of any contracts we enter into.  Equally important, we should accept that the existence 
of these duties implies the presence of claims by individuals for duties owed not just from them, 
but owed to them   Among these duties are the duties “not to murder. . . not to steal or lie, to give 
aid to those in need, or to promote justice”.77  In this way, an important aspect of being human 
involves appropriate moral attention claimed by ourselves and others and based on our moral 
rights.
78
 Thus, Simmons builds the case that natural moral rights are grounded in our individual 
moral freedom, and are available to us as stateless individuals.
79
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In this stateless existence (or the state of nature), according to Simmons, the individual 
has the moral freedom and capacity of individual agency to “dispose of . . . [his] person or 
possessions (as always within the bounds of natural law).” 80  The stateless individual’s 
interactions are not yet shaped by a state authority, and are not circumscribed by membership.  
This, then, is the person in her natural environment, and any state which wishes to be recognized 
as a legitimate authority must meet this moral baseline of individual moral freedom when it 
makes demands on that moral freedom.
81
  What is at issue here is once a state is justifiable, how 
does it behave towards those it encounters? Does it behave in ways that violate individuals’ 
natural moral duties and rights?  Among these rights, does it violate their natural moral 
freedom?   
For Simmons, this baseline of natural moral freedom which states initially are formed to 
protect, is too soon dismissed by theories of state legitimacy in favor of stability.  In theories like 
Stilz’s, what begins as an attempt at protecting freedom equally for all eventually becomes about 
maintaining security at the cost of individual moral freedom.  Simmons believes this sort of 
theory is flawed in two ways:  first, if natural moral rights precede the existence of the state, the 
state can only be legitimate if the special duties and benefits it arranges do not in practice negate 
an individual’s obligations to other individuals and their moral freedom.  Second, if it wants to 
be a legitimate authority, the state cannot claim special political obligations without an explicit, 
historical, un-coerced contract with each individual it wishes to hold in obligation, since to do 
otherwise would violate that individual’s natural moral freedom.82  
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2.10 A Lockean Alternative  
As an offer of an alternative theory of special political obligation, Simmons draws on 
John Locke’s framework for a liberal doctrine of personal consent, arguing that only through 
genuine and un-coerced consent can a state not violate the equal freedom of each individual to 
have “power over his own life.”83    Simmons points out that the consent feature of Locke’s 
theory is crucial to revealing the weaknesses of our intuitions about our relationship to the 
existing state.  
Why doesn’t the Lockean simply say: because limited states are morally 
acceptable (or ideal) and a good bargain, they ought to be accepted by those 
subject to them; so particular limited states are legitimate and enjoy the right to 
rule and their subjects have obligations to comply with them?
84
 
 
If cooperation with others yields a better—albeit imperfect—level of justice, morality, or 
freedom than we would have otherwise, why is that not enough to legitimate coercion of the 
unwilling?  The Lockean, Simmons believes, would argue that “the general qualities or virtues of 
a state (i.e., those features of it appealed to in its justification) are one thing; the nature of its 
rights over any particular subject (i.e., that in which its legitimacy with respect to that subject 
consists) are quite another thing.”85  In other words, although our cooperation and participation 
in a state might contribute to its meeting moral requirements, and although we are under the 
general obligation to behave morally toward one another, this still does not underwrite 
mandatory involvement in our own reasonably just state.  Simmons argues, “The fact that a state 
or a business has virtues that can be appealed to in order to justify its existence cannot by itself 
argue for its having special rights over particular individuals.”86   
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What, then, might reasonably allow a state to coerce an unwilling citizen into 
participating in state schemes?  For Simmons, the answer is simple:  “Only interacting with 
you—and in a way that we normally suppose gives one party a moral right to expect something 
of another—will seem to “legitimate” its imposition and/or enforcement of duties on you.”87 
Indeed, he continues, any attempt to “deny this is simply to deny the natural freedom of 
persons”.88 Thus, for Simmons, actual consent is required of each person in order to make state 
authority legitimate. 
2.11 Two Answers to the Problem of State Stability 
While this might address coercion, how does this address Stilz’s other argument, that the 
state requires uniform participation in order to continue its just and legitimate existence, and that 
withholders who opt out weaken the fabric of the system, thereby jeopardizing the state as a 
facilitator of justice?  Simmons wants to argue that “mere nonparticipation by the unwilling does 
not constitute an effort to undermine or an attack on clients.  . . where mere nonparticipation by 
the unwilling is sufficient to render a state . . . nonviable, that by itself . . . amounts to an 
argument that the state . . .  has no right to use coercion on the unwilling to insure its continued 
existence.”89    To do this, he must address two facets of Stilz’s stability argument. 
 The first facet of Stilz’s argument is a positive duty claim: the individual has a duty to be 
a stabilizing force for the state through contributions and active participation in the public forum.  
Simmons’ response to this is to claim that there is no correlativity between the justification of a 
state and special obligations to a state, arguing that the state is a kind of thing that gives “moral 
reasons to refrain from undermining it . . . and moral reasons to positively support [it]... But a 
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particular state’s being justified in this way cannot ground any special moral relationship 
between it and you.”90  As Simmons points out, the logical implications of positive duty claims 
actually undermine the anticipated and desired result:    
“. . . [E]ven if you had perfectly general duties to promote justice and happiness, 
say, and consequently duties to support just or happiness-producing states, these 
duties would require of you that you support all such states, providing you with 
no necessary reason to show any special favoritism or unique allegiance to your 
own just state, and providing none of those states with any special right to impose 
on you additional duties.”91 
  
The fact that the state could determine terms of behavior merely by offering a form of 
determinate justice does not negate the natural moral faculty/capacity  possessed by the 
individual, nor does the agreement of some individuals over codified behavior make it obligatory 
for all, or any who did not acquiesce to such limitations. If it did, an individual’s mere presence 
within a territory could commit the individual to a proscribed definition of moral behavior and a 
state-defined set of special obligations, a troubling implication for any free individual, as well as 
any state.   
 The second feature of Stilz’s account of stability taxes the individual with a negative duty 
to not destabilize the state.  In this case, the chief concern is that an individual’s moral freedom 
might lead her opt out of certain civic or political behaviors, in such a way that “[her] failure will 
in some way affect the performance of . . . duties to others.”92  This concern is an echo of Stilz’s 
positive special political obligations that involve contributions and behaviors that affect the 
functions of the state, and she analogizes a failure to participate politically to failing to render 
Samaritan aid, where such a failure is a specific moral failure.  This type of analogy, however, as 
Simmons points out, has significant flaws.  Should I fail to provide emergency aid, it is easy to 
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see how my failure to participate is at once both a particular and general moral failure, since in 
this case, the determination of my moral duty is already limited in scope and application under 
the situation of rescue.  However, should I choose not to participate in voting, citizen education, 
or reporting of a neighbors’ minor traffic violation, it is hard to see how this constitutes failure of 
duty.  Moral duty requires that I refrain from harming others, and it requires Samaritan aid—but 
it in no way obligates me to participate in one specific scheme solely on account of it being a 
moral scheme.  There is, as such, no need to “injure” my freedom in order to satisfy the schemes 
of others, so long as “my participation in those arrangements is not necessary to their success.”93   
If, as Simmons argues, the only concern arises when my failure causes harm to others, 
then the impact of my failure to act still only corresponds to a general duty not to inflict harm, 
and does not arise from some special un-contracted obligation to others. Thus, if Simmons’ 
argument holds, I never have a reason to obey the state just because the state demands it of me as 
a citizen, or even because I have benefitted from the cooperative scheme which generated a 
receipt of unasked-for open benefits.
94
 In fact, according to Simmons, I may have very good 
reasons to act in ways that comply with the state—I may even have good reasons for not wanting 
to inhibit state actions—but this does not commit me to a citizenship-type obligation just because 
the state demands it.
95
  Ultimately, Simmons argues, the state is an institution that cannot 
unilaterally impose duties on anyone, including its citizens. In that respect, it is like any other 
institution. 
96
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2.12 Stilz’s response to Simmons’ Institutions Objection 
It is precisely this “state as institution” argument, however, that Stilz believes leaves 
Simmons open to critique. First, she takes aim at his treatment of the state as equivalent to any 
other type of institution. Certainly it would be shocking, she writes, to find in the mail a 
threatening bill for collection from an institution with which I have no history.
97
 But this is to 
wrongly assume that obligations to the state and obligations to a private institution are generated 
in ways that are parallel. Even more damning, however, is that the weight of his argument rests 
on one key, but shaky premise—the notion that people are capable of acting in equal freedom in 
the state of nature, and the built-in assumption that equal freedom can exist in a state of nature at 
all.  Stilz writes, “If it could be shown that there is no way to establish a condition of equal 
freedom without the state, then Simmons would have to concede that we were obligated to the 
state on grounds of natural duty alone. By establishing a framework of uniform public laws, in 
other words, it may actually be that a legitimate state brings a condition of equal freedom into 
being for the very first time.”98  
To counter Simmons’ analogy of the state as institution, Stilz draws on Kant’s argument 
on freedom and property rights, both key components in Simmons’ theory. As we have seen, 
Simmons’ believes that general rights can be fully realized and be made determinate by 
individuals without the state.  However, Stilz points out, Simmons’ theory of “natural” moral 
freedom is built upon an individual’s right to dispense with property and possessions at will.  
Whether or not this right to possessions and their use is determinate in a state of nature is crucial 
to the disagreement between Simmons and Stilz on the real scope of freedom available to the 
stateless individual. 
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Simmons’ posits that in a state of nature, individual humans have a natural moral right to 
control over themselves and their labor. The liberal value of control over one’s life trajectory 
requires access to a “fair share” of resources, and at least some degree of noninterference from 
others in this access.  Simmons writes that “property is an indispensible condition of self-
government. Property does not, then, merely ensure survival; it is also the security for our 
freedom, protecting us against dependence on the will of others and the subservience to them that 
this creates.”99  This interpretation requires that freedom have a moral structure: to the extent that 
freedom as independence for Simmons is about the individual, it is just as strikingly apparent 
that he draws certain conclusions about our relationships with other people and the kinds of 
interference we wish to prevent and the kinds of agreement we are capable of reaching and 
enforcing in the absence of the state.  Underwriting Simmons’ notion of rights to possessions, 
then, is an assumption that other forms of associations can appropriately meet the needs for 
which Stilz invokes the state.    
At issue here is whether or not Simmons’ understanding of natural moral obligation can 
be made sufficiently determinate in a state of nature to adjudicate conflicts without a state-like 
authority. More precisely: do rights have enough  content on their own to be epistemically 
accessible to the rights bearers?  Stilz points to a handy counter-example:  even within state 
systems, property definitions vary widely and require adjudication and dispute resolution. Thus, 
Stilz argues, it would seem that the notion that two people in a state of nature will honor 
indeterminate moral obligations about resource use and development—to say nothing about 
getting that same agreement to be reciprocated by multiple people in a state of nature—verges 
upon being farfetched.  Stilz points to Kant, arguing that “while a principle of equal freedom 
provides us some information about what just property distributions should look like, the 
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principle’s content is underspecified, and therefore cannot be directly applied.”100  Kant, 
observing what he believes is the unlikelihood of peaceful resolution over property in a state of 
nature, argues that we are so dependent upon resources and property for exercise of equal 
freedom as to make the state necessary, even to the degree of forcing our willing or unwilling 
involvement, in order for us to fulfill our obligation to be moral.  This under-specification, 
combined with the individual’s natural freedom, a lack of cooperation, and a natural right to use 
force in defense of vital resources, results in a constant state of struggle against the encroachment 
of others.  Stilz believes that this leaves the individual, ultimately, unfree, and subject to 
interference by anyone she is unable to convince or overpower.   
Ultimately, argues Stilz, Simmons’ assumption that my property would consist of “my 
fair share,” requires the acquiescence of others as to what that fair share is. Indeed, she argues, 
even if we grant a permissive law of possession and exclusion in a state of nature, which both 
Locke and Simmons do, this by no means guarantees an adequately specified normative 
agreement  on the obligations stemming from the “natural moral right” to property, an agreement 
that Simmons assumes to be possible. Instead of a Lockean version of property, Stilz argues, we 
should look to the Kantian alternative: 
Fundamentally, Kant argues that defining and enforcing both our rights 
over our bodies and our rights to external objects through public and 
nonarbitrary laws is the only way to secure ourselves against the coercive 
interference of other private persons in our affairs. For Kant, then, the only 
sort of property distribution to which we could all hypothetically consent 
must necessarily be one that is defined and enforced by the state, since all 
privately enforced distributions have the inevitable side effect of 
subjecting us to the will of others.
101
 
 
Simmons assumes that in a state of nature, because we are all subject to natural moral 
obligations, we already are obligated to structure our duties towards other individuals in ways 
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that suit the needs of both them and us, and that we are obligated to do so regardless of outside 
enforcement.  But Stilz argues that  
It might be said, by someone of a more Lockean persuasion, that one of 
these competing interpretations [of our natural obligations] is the one that 
simply is valid as a moral fact. That may be so. But as long as we remain 
in a state of nature, even this true view of right must remain unrealized, 
since each person, being an equally authoritative judge, has a right to 
enforce his or her own interpretation of justice, which means the true view 
of right places the person under no duties when it does not correspond 
with the person’s own. So long as we remain our own judges and self-
enforcers, there is no means by which we might establish which 
interpretation of right is morally valid without claiming the authority to 
serve as judge in another person’s behalf and forcibly subject that person 
to our will.
102
 
 
 This interpretation, Stilz argues, violates both Simmons’ notion of the person as an independent 
and equally free person, and doesn’t really leave us as free as we think we should be in the state 
of nature.
103
  The only way to preserve our equal freedom against others, argues Stilz, is Kant’s 
solution of adopting a procedure for determining, adjudicating, and enforcing a set of objective 
rights from indeterminate natural rights.
104
  This itself depends upon “the necessity of coercive 
political authority” not merely to regulate the malevolent or immoral, but also to create the 
necessary conditions for justice as equal freedom.
105
  Even if all were in agreement as to our 
natural property rights, my dependence upon your good will to always respect my rights grants 
you too much power over my security and freedom. My obligation to respect your rights, and 
your obligation to respect mine, still rests upon the strength of force and sheer good will for 
enforcement. If, however, we grant the involvement of an impartial third party to defend our 
rights against interference, then my security and freedom become less dependent upon your good 
will or my strength of force, and our rights are more equally enforced against one another 
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through the guarantee of third party assistance.  Incorporating a third party not biased in favor of 
either of us allows both you and me a greater chance at realizing truly equal freedom, the 
ultimate value in Simmons’ theory.  
If we agree that individuals in a state of nature have varying abilities to defend their own 
natural moral rights and thereby achieve equal freedom, and if respect for equal freedom is in 
fact a moral obligation that we owe one another, then, Stilz argues, it stands to reason that we 
have a duty to submit ourselves to a third party capable of realizing equal freedom for all. Stilz 
argues, in effect, that despite Simmons’ assertion to the contrary, “we already will the existence 
of the state . . . as soon as we will the legitimate possession of private property, simply because 
our duties to respect others’ freedom cannot be satisfied in any other way.”106  If we accept that 
some rights are indeterminate, and require articulation, agreement, and enforcement, Stilz 
argues, this commits us to agree that we are bound to support our own institutions of justice 
which promote the equal freedom of those with whom our freedom is connected, so long as those 
institutions are themselves sufficiently just. 
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3     CONCLUSION 
  
3.1 The Problem of State-Breaking 
Stilz builds her argument on the Kantian premise that there are too few determinate rights for 
individuals to attain equal freedom in the absence of the state.  This appears to make individuals 
need the state, if only to post up an authority to make those rights determinate.  Faced with 
having to choose between indeterminate rights with little strength to back up our own freedom, 
or determinate rights but the obligation to support the state which backs them--Stilz’s case seems 
to be persuasive. 
I believe, however, that Simmons makes a compelling point that a competing sense of 
rights—specifically Lockean rights—might reveal a weakness to a Kantian natural duty 
argument of obligation and loyalty.  If Simmons is correct that basic rights are more fully 
determinate and epistemically accessible than Stilz allows for them to be, then Stilz’s case looks 
vulnerable.  If there is, in fact, knowable content to the things we have a natural right to—then it 
is possible that we might not necessarily experience high degrees of disagreement over what 
those rights are.  If this is the case, then it’s possible we don’t need the state to define those rights 
for us, thereby saving us from a state of nature.   As it result, arguments for the necessity of the 
state as a coercive force necessary for underwriting equal freedom look slightly rigged.   
This suspicion darkens when we look at the net effect of Stilz’s argument on notions of 
political rights, in particular, the moral right of territorially-based minority groups to break away 
from an existing state and form their own.  Stilz has hollowed out the meaningful content of 
rights by assuming that only the state has the power, and the means, to make rights determinate 
45 
for vulnerable individuals.  But this framing of the situation is disconcerting when we realize that 
there may be rights we are being forced to abdicate under the assumption that abdicating them is 
the price for asking the state to frame and broker basic thresholds of equality and security—
rights that may not actually need state determination, but which may still benefit from state 
enforcement.  But as we’ve seen, if her assumption is wrong, then I might very well have more 
content among my set of pre-political rights than she allows.  If so, it seems stringent, and 
illiberal, to force loyalty to the state of which I happen to be a citizen.  
As a case example:  suppose that freedom of association is a right with defined, knowable 
content.  Given this, groups of individuals might come to realize that an injustice need not be 
required to engage in state-breaking.  Indeed, they may break off, and decide to organize a new 
state, or even to join a cosmopolitan one-world state.  What is clear is that once bids for freedom 
of association begin among minority groups, state breaking may not be far off, and Stilz assumes 
that this means a threat to the stability and legitimacy of the state, which she has tasked with 
underwriting justice and security.  Structured this way, unfortunately, a threat to the state 
unnecessarily becomes a threat to justice as equal freedom.  But if there is content to our rights, 
this need not be the case:  political reorganization need not be the threat she sees it to be.  A state 
might become smaller—or even dissolve entirely--without reducing the content or enforceability 
of the rights the remaining individuals.  Coercion here looks much more like a mechanism for 
maintain state size and accessibility to means rather than a definer and enforcer of vague and 
nebulous rights.  
In the end, Stilz’s argument may illuminate the extent to which we assume coercion to be 
a necessary part of thresholds for security and justice, but this doesn’t go very far in explaining 
why we must provide loyalty to this state, and not some other state of our own making or 
46 
choosing that is equally capable of underwriting justice and security in a format we prefer.  What 
is lacking, one suspects, is a developed concept of  political rights of collective self-governance 
resulting from a right to freedom of association, to serves as a counterweight the strong drive for 
security evidenced in Stilz’s theory.   
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